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landlord had only the option of suing on the contract or treating it as
abrogated and entering into an entirely new contract;' 9 (e) on the
ground that such an executed agreement is a waiver of the balance of
the rent, a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, for which con-
sideration is not necessary."0 In California a statute provides for a
waiver of the balance."
From these cases then, it may be said that written agreements, and
executed oral agreements, to reduce rent from that originally reserved,
must be supported by consideration, but that the courts will find consid-
eration in almost any benefit to the lessor, or detriment to the lessee. It
is significant that almost without exception, every case since 1900 involv-
ing the two foregoing classes of cases has been held valid and binding
upon the lessor.
In the principal case the court held that where the lease provides
that in the event the property is rendered unfit for occupancy because of
fire the rent for the remainder of the term should abate, and if a fire
occurs at the end of the ninth month of the rent-year, the rent for the
succeeding three months is abated, and the lessor may not recover the
rent for the last three months, either on the theory that the entire annual
rental should have been paid in the first nine installments, or on the
theory that the lessor may so apply the payments made that the rent for
the first three months of the annual term shall remain unpaid, and the
irregular installments of rent applied to the rent for the last three months.
On the second of the two theories the lessor relied on the case of Felix
v. Griffiths, 56 Ohio St. 39, 45 N.E. 1092 (897), which held that
rent paid in advance cannot be recovered under the fire clause in this
lease. J. ERNEST STILWELL
NEGLIGENCE
LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND VENDORS
Ascertaining the liability of a manufacturer or vendor to those not
in privity of contract with them has presented the courts with a diflicult
problem. In the recent Ohio case of Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St.
291, 13 N.E. (2d) 250, io Ohio Op. 367 (1938), the plaintiff, who
owned a beauty-shop, purchased hair dye from a retailer to whom the
' Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921).
Hurlbut v. Buttc-Kansas Co., 12o Kan. 20, 243 Pac. 324 (1926).
21 California Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 2o76, provides that objection to the
amount of a tender must be made at the time the tender is made, or the person to whom
the tender is made is deemed to have waived the balance. Applied in Julian v. Gold,
214 Cal. 74, 3 Pac. (2d) 1009 (193).
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defendant distributor had sold. In using the dye on a customer the
plaintiff suffered injuries as a consequence of some poisonous substance
therein. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the holding of the
Appellate Court that it was error to charge the jury on the issue of
negligence.
The problem suggested is susceptible to two entirely separate avenues
of approach: one based on tort; the other on warranty. The two theories
are readily distinguishable since in order to maintain an action in tort it
is necessary to prove negligence, whereas in order to maintain an action
in warranty only a breach thereof need be shown. Under the latter
theory, however, it is necessary to show privity of contract. The necessity
of privity in a tort action was probably first asserted in the celebrated case
of Winterbottom v. Wright, io M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402
(842), wherein by the way of dicta, it was said that a manufacturer
or vendor was not liable for negligence to one with whom he had no
contractual relations. Bohlen, "Liability of Manufacturers to Persons
other than their Immediate Vendees," 45 L. Q. Rev. 343 (929)-
Always recognized as the general rule, numerous exceptions have been
established to avoid the consequences of this doctrine. The first exception
was noted in the case of articles inherently dangerous to life and health
or intended to preserve or destroy life. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y.
397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (852). Although the courts have quite gen-
erally recognized an exception in the case of inherently dangerous
articles, there has been considerable confusion in determining what
articles should be placed in this category. Freezer, "Tort Liability of
Manufacturers and Vendors," IO Minn. L. Rev. 1 (925). The early
cases construed the exception strictly and included only those articles
which were intended to preserve or destroy life. Thus drugs, Thomas
v. Winchester, supra; Norton v. Sewall, io6 Mass. 143, 8 Am. Rep.
298 (870); Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350
(1887); weapons, Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475,
17 A.L.R. 701 (1918); Ross v. Dunstall, 62 Can. S.C. 393, 63
D.L.R. 63 (i92I); and explosives, Ellis v. Republic Oil Co., 133 Iowa
ii, 1no N.W. 20 (i9o6); Weiser v. Holzman, 33 Wash. 87, 99
Am. St. Rep. 932, 73 Pac. 797 (903), fell within this category. Later
food, Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W.
382, 17 A.L.R. 649 (1920); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 Fed.
921, 16o C.C.A. iii, L.R.A. 19 i8D, 798 (917) was included and
many other articles have followed. Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918); Cahill v. Inecto, 208 App.
Div. 191, 203 N.Y. Supp. i (1924).
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In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E.
I05o, L.R.A. I 9 i6F 696, the plaintiff, a remote vendee, was injured
when the car he had purchased suddenly collapsed due to the defective
wood used in making one of the wheels. The court expressly refused
to limit the manufacturer's liability to articles that were intended to
affect life, and held that it was sufficient if the article was likely to
endanger life and limb if negligently constructed. Most jurisdictions
have adopted this test. Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., IOI N.J.L. 385,
128 Ad. 242 (1925); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed.
878 (1919); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152,
162 N.E. 633 (1928); Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 395-
Some authority exists for saying that there can be no recovery from
the vendor or manufacturer for mere property damage. Windram Mfg.
Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921);
Thompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., 239 Mass. 147, 131 N.E. 456
(1921). But more courts allow recovery if the article is of such char-
acter as to be imminently dangerous to human life and property. Skinn
v. Ruetter, 135 Mich. 57, 97 N.W. 152, 63 L.R.A. 743, io6 Am. St.
Rep. 384 (1903); Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div.
433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915). At least one case has allowed
recovery when the article was dangerous to property only. Ellis v.
Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929).
The early Ohio cases permitted recovery in cases involving inherently
dangerous articles which might be reconciled under the more narrow
construction of the exception. lmon Bailey v. N. W. Ohio Natural
Gas Co., 2 Ohio C. Dec., 656, 4 Ohio C.C. 471 (189o); Davis v.
Guarneri, supra. White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Fiesel, supra, on the
other hand, adopted the more liberal view of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Car Co.1 supra, and allowed recovery for injuries resulting from
a negligently constructed electric plug.
The principal case is the first discussion by the Ohio Supreme Court
of the liability of a vendor to a remote vendee for negligence since the
Buick case was decided by the New York Court. On its particular facts
it requires no considerable extension of the early Ohio rule to include
hair dye in the category of inherently dangerous articles. Yet the
apparent approval given by the Court to the Buick case indicates that
Ohio will apply the same test. A manufacturer or vendor will be held
liable to a remote vendee for negligence if the article because of negli-
gent construction is dangerous to the vendee, even though its purpose
was not to preserve or destroy life and the danger was due only to the
defective construction.
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It is doubtful whether the court meant to commit itself on the
question of recovery on the'theory of implied warranty where no privity
of contract exists; yet the language of the court allows the conclusion
that such a problem when presented will receive liberal treatment. For
a discussion of this problem, see 4 O.S.L.J. 403.
WILLIAM L. ANDERSON
TORTS
RELEASE BY THE SOLE BENEFICIARY UNDER THE WRONGFUL
DEATH ACT
Ralph Pilkington, a minor, was injured by defendant on April 7,
1934. His mother, who was his next of kin and sole beneficiary under
the Wrongful Death Act, made application to the probate judge for
consent to a settlement for $495 without the appointment of a guardian
as provided in General Code, section 10507-I9. The court gave its
consent and ordered payment by defendant and execution of a release
by Mrs. Pilkington (for Ralph) of any and all claims arising out of the
accident and injuries. This release was executed on May 24, 1934, and
on the same day, Mrs. Pilkington in consideration of $225 executed
another release of all actions or claims she had or might have in the
future as sole beneficiary under the wrongful death statute. The son
died July 2, 1935, from the results of the injury, and the present action
for wrongful death was brought by his administratrix for the next of
kin. The court of appeals stated that the release by the decedent would
not bar such an action, but held that the additional release by the sole
beneficiary prior to the death of the injured person constituted a valid
defense to any action subsequently brought by the personal representative
of the deceased under the wrongful death statute. Pilkington. v. Sans,
25 Ohio L. Abs. 663 (Ohio App. 1938).
In reiterating the doctrine that a settlement and release by the
decedent is no defense to an action for wrongful death brought by his
personal representative after his death, the court once again states the
minority view which has, as yet, been followed by the courts of Ohio.
General Code, section I05o9-i66 gives the personal representative an
action to be brought for the benefit of the next of kin "when the death
of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default such as would
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover dam-
ages in respect thereof, if death had not ensued. . . . " There are like
provisions in the statutes of all states. The earlier Ohio cases held that a
